Fraud, Freedom, and Fundamental Fairness: Getting Beyond the Economic Loss Rule by England, Benjamin
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 53 Number 3 Article 6 
4-1-1999 
Fraud, Freedom, and Fundamental Fairness: Getting Beyond the 
Economic Loss Rule 
Benjamin England 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Benjamin England, Fraud, Freedom, and Fundamental Fairness: Getting Beyond the Economic Loss Rule, 
53 U. Miami L. Rev. 505 (2015) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol53/iss3/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
COMMENTS
Fraud, Freedom, and Fundamental Fairness:
Getting Beyond the Economic Loss Rule
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 505
11. BENEATH THE SURFACE OF THE ECONOMIC Loss RULE ......................... 509
A. Fraud in the Inducement .......................................... 512
1. "ooPs! I JUST MADE A CONTRACT!" ................................... 513
2. "1 KNOW YOU THINK YOU KNOW WHAT I PROMISED .................... 514
B. Fraud in the Performance ......................................... 515
III. CLEARING THE FIELDS ON FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT .......................... 518
IV. FREE TO BE STUCK, STUCK WITH YOUR CHOICE, CHOOSING A REMEDY ...... 524
A. A Summary of Florida's Law on Liquidated Damages ................. 526
B. Big Lies and Little Lies ........................................... 528
C. If This is Freedom, I'll Do Without ................................. 529
D. When Tort and Contract Collide ................................... 531
E. To Protect or Not to Protect? ...................................... 537
V . C ONCLUSION ........................................................ 537
I. INTRODUCTION
Bob Owner, Chief Executive Officer of privately held company
XYZ, was contacted by Jane Acquiror, a young and energetic merger
and acquisition entrepreneur who was acquiring new companies to
develop for public trading. Based upon Owner's offer to sell XYZ for
$1,250,000, Acquiror's certified public accountant conducted an exten-
sive audit of XYZ's financial records to determine the company's net
worth and the potential for a merger with another of its publicly held
corporations. After reviewing XYZ's records, Acquiror's accountant
estimated XYZ to be worth $1,500,000.
During subsequent negotiations, XYZ's Chief Operations Officer,
John Leaker, expressed concern to Acquiror about her accountant's val-
uation of XYZ. Leaker warned Acquiror to "watch Owner because he's
a snake." When Acquiror confronted Owner about XYZ's current value,
Owner reminded her that her own financial advisor's analysis produced
the figure upon which they both were relying.
Acquiror continued the negotiations for the purchase of XYZ; how-
ever, she began to concentrate on obtaining a warranty that provided a
concrete guarantee as to the business' financial condition. Owner was
reluctant to do more than orally vouch for XYZ's general condition.
Acquiror agreed to an alternative approach when Owner offered to
include a liquidated damages clause in the sales contract. The clause
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provided that, should the net worth of the business actually be valued at
less than $1,000,000, Owner would pay liquidated damages in the
amount of $50,000 plus 15% of the difference between the business'
actual net worth and $1,000,000. The contract for sale foreclosed all
expressed and implied warranties.
Both parties vigorously negotiated the terms of the agreement to
sell XYZ and, based partly upon the recommendation of her financial
advisor, Acquiror believed she was sufficiently protected from any
potential fraud that Owner may have attempted to perpetrate while strik-
ing the bargain.
Relying on the negotiations and the written agreement, Acquiror
accepted Owner's modified offer to sell XYZ for $1,150,000. Prior to
the sale, Acquiror found it necessary to make adaptations in the opera-
tions of another one of her businesses in preparation for enfolding XYZ
into her portfolio of corporations. These adjustments cost Acquiror
$75,000 and involved personnel and office relocations.
After the sale, Acquiror began operations at XYZ with minor adap-
tations and raised additional revenue from the sale of publicly traded
stock. She eventually discovered numerous fraudulent transactions in
XYZ's financial records. These cleverly concealed transactions were
associated with various government contracts. Several of these transac-
tions were outstanding and, if executed, would create potential and
severe liabilities for contract fraud against the government to Acquiror
and to her new investors. The outstanding transactions, reflected as
accounts receivable, were worth $375,000 and were included in the net
worth analysis performed by Acquiror's own accountant.
Acquiror sued Owner in contract under the liquidated damages
clause and in tort pleading fraud in the inducement of the contract. In
her tort claim, she sought the difference between her recoverable amount
under the liquidated damages clause and the contract price. She also
prayed for relief for the $75,000 spent in adjustments to her other busi-
nesses and for punitive damages. Owner moved to dismiss Acquiror's
claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract arguing that it violated
Florida's economic loss rule. Owner contended that Acquiror bargained
for a remedy, the liquidated damages clause, which specifically
addressed the value of the business. Therefore, he argued, her remedy
should be restricted to the terms of the sales contract. Additionally, he
argued that absent reliance, contract law precluded recovery for prepara-
tion to perform a contract, so he should not be liable for the $75,000
Acquiror spent to make her business adjustments.
The above scenario presents several problems, some of which Flor-
ida courts have been wrestling with for many years, others of which are
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sure to follow. Florida's economic loss rule is arguably one of the last
bulwarks that separates tort law from contract law. Of the various theo-
ries advanced for its operation, each posits that the economic loss rule
precludes recovery for mere pecuniary loss if no personal injury or prop-
erty damage has been sustained. From this common ground, the theories
have diverged, both in the literature and from the bench. As a result,
Judge Lazzara of the Second District Court of Appeal recently lamented
that "the economic loss rule is stated with ease but applied with great
difficulty."'
Florida's economic loss rule finds its doctrinal origins in a Califor-
nia Supreme Court case, Seely v. White Motor Co.' In Seeley, Justice
Traynor denied the plaintiffs strict liability claim where a defectively
manufactured pickup truck overturned but caused no physical injury to
the plaintiff or his property.' Justice Traynor limited the plaintiffs
claim to contract and held that if no physical injury resulted from the
defective product, the manufacturer should not "be held liable to the
level of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless
he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's
demand."4
Following Justice Traynor's reasoning, the Florida Supreme Court
first used the economic loss rule to preclude tort liability in Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.' Since that case, the
economic loss rule has been used by Florida courts to bar recovery for
actions brought in tort for negligence,6 fraud,7 conversion,8 civil theft,9
Florida RICO, 10 and breach of fiduciary duty".
This progressive degeneration of tort liability in Florida eventually
came to a halt in 1996. In Woodson v. Martin,2 the Florida Supreme
Court held that a separate tort action could co-exist with a breach of
contract claim even though both allegations resulted in economic loss.
The case involved a claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract. 3
1. Delgado v. J.W. Courtesy Pontiac GMC Truck, Inc., 693 So. 2d 602, 606 (Fla. 2d DCA
1997).
2. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
3. Id. at 151.
4. Id.
5. 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987).
6. See Moransais v. Heathman, 702 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
7. See CWoodson v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
8. See Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Atlantic Travel Serv., 841 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
9. See Sarkis v. Pafford Oil Co., Inc., 697 So. 2d 524 (Fla. Ist DCA 1997).
10. See Ginsberg v. Lennar Florida Holdings, Inc., 645 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
11. See Karn v. Caldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc., 23 Fla. L. Weekly D339 (Fla.
4th DCA Jan. 28, 1998).
12. 685 So. 2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. 1996).
13. See id.
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This case turned the tide on the previous tendencies of Florida courts to
prevent separate independent tort theories for recovery of pecuniary
losses when there was a contract between the parties.
One difference in cash value between contract and tort claims is the
availability of punitive damages.14 As in the above hypothetical scena-
rio, the question arises whether Bob Owner should be subject to punitive
damages for fraud in the inducement of the contract to sell XYZ. Recall
that Jane Acquiror sought a warranty guaranteeing the financial condi-
tion of XYZ Corporation. In the contract for sale of XYZ, Owner and
Acquiror specifically negotiated a liquidated damages clause that
addressed the corporation's value, the very factor upon which Acquiror
later alleged Owner defrauded her. It is not difficult to conclude that
Acquiror bargained for and obtained her remedy under the contract and
should be limited to it. So, whether she will recover more than the
amount provided for under the liquidated damages clause depends upon
whether the clause is valid under Florida law. If it is valid, then it must
be determined whether the public policy considerations underlying the
validity of such remedial clauses would be undercut by permitting
Acquiror to claim tort damages for the very conduct which the liqui-
dated damages clause was intended to remedy.
An elementary principle in construing the validity of a liquidated
damages clause is whether it can be fairly characterized as a penalty
clause.' 5 Contract law traditionally has had a particular distaste for pen-
alties and promotes the efficient breach of contract for the benefit of the
public economy in which contracts usually arise.16
This article addresses these issues at length and argues that, given
the recent fall of the economic loss rule in regards to fraud in the induce-
ment, it is not sound to permit a liquidated damages clause (or any other
remedial clause) to drag the tort claim into the contract claim and pre-
clude traditional tort remedies. Part II deals with the line of cases that
developed prior to the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Woodson v.
Martin'7 and examines the self-contradictory language in an earlier prin-
cipal case which created the conflict in the district courts of appeal. Part
III addresses the Florida Supreme Court's reversal of the trend to pre-
clude fraud in the inducement based upon the economic loss rule. Part
IV examines Florida's policies on liquidated damages clauses and how
they conflict with tort law policies in general. This section also offers a
potential solution to resolving the choice of law problem by borrowing
14. See Williams v. Peak Resorts Int'l. Inc., 676 So. 2d 513, 521 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
15. See Humana Medical Plan, Inc. v. Jacobson, 685 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
16. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 12.3 at 847 n.3 (2d ed. 1990).
17. 685 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1996).
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principles from Florida's conflict of law rules. Part V draws conclusions
from the analysis and argues that a tort claim should not be barred in a
case where a liquidated damages clause purports to deal with the subject
matter that is also the basis for a fraud.
Contract law is designed to regulate reciprocal promises between
parties who stand in some relation to one another.18 Conversely, tort
law predominantly addresses general breaches of duties owed to the
public.1 9 This article argues that permitting a party to intentionally
defraud another while punishing the defrauded party for attempting to
protect herself from pecuniary loss naturally resulting from a potential
fraud, is contrary to both contract and tort law policy principles.
Notwithstanding a liquidated damages clause in a contract to cover
the very factor which is the subject of a fraud inducing the contract, the
fraud should remain a viable independent action permitting recovery for
damages above and beyond those remedied by the liquidated damages
clause. A contrary conclusion would turn both contract law and tort law
on their respective heads. Nevertheless, for a period of several years,
Florida courts were precluding fraud in the inducement claims in cases
where the plaintiff could only plead economic losses.
II. BENEATH THE SURFACE OF THE ECONOMIC Loss RULE
The economic loss rule is a creature of tort law and represents one
of the most significant common law limits on tort liability. z Stated in
its simplest terms, the economic loss rule operates as a common law
denial of tort remedies when, in the context of a contractual relationship,
the only losses sustained by a party are pecuniary..21 The Florida
Supreme Court has determined that such pecuniary interests are more
appropriately protected by contract principles than by tort principles.22
In this sense, the rule acts as a contract-law limit on a tort-law claim.23
The Florida Supreme Court in Casa Clara acknowledged the role that
18. See FARNSWORTH1 supra note 16, § 1.1, at 4.
19. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS, 1 (9th ed. 1994).
20. See id. at 459 n.2.
21. In commercial settings, the majority rule defines "economic loss" or "damage" as the loss
of the benefit of a buyer's bargain. 63B Am. JUR. 2D § 1909 (1996).
22. See Casa Clara Condominium Assn v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244,
1246 (Fla. 1993).
23. The Casa Clara court characterized the issue in the following statement: "When only
economic harm is involved, the question becomes 'whether the consuming public as a whole
should bear the cost of economic losses sustained by those who failed to bargain for adequate
contract remedies."' 620 So. 2d at 1247 (quoting Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic
Loss in Tort for Construction Defects: A Critical Analysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 933 (1989)). The
consuming public is protected by tort duties where as interests of parties to a contract are
protected by the terms of the contract itself.
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the economic loss rule plays in separating two distinct bodies of Florida
law stating, "[t]he rule is 'the fundamental boundary between contract
law, which is designed to enforce the expectancy interests of the parties,
and tort law, which imposes a duty of reasonable care and thereby
encourages citizens to avoid causing physical harm to others.' "24
Although the supreme court in Casa Clara established a reasonable
and necessary distinction between legal theories, and the economic rule
may assist courts in keeping basic fundamental principles in their proper
legal perspectives, it did not play out so neatly for the Casa Clara plain-
tiffs. Casa Clara was framed as a breach of implied warranty, negli-
gence, and product liability case, where the defendant allegedly
manufactured concrete which was too high in salt content for use in
reinforced concrete block building construction.25 The high salinity
caused the steel reinforcement bars to rust over time.26 The concrete
was sold to and used by a general contractor in the construction of the
plaintiffs' condominiums and the expanding re-bar produced progressive
cracks which ultimately led to the concrete breaking off and falling to
the ground." In its ruling, the Supreme Court essentially told the plain-
tiffs that they should strike better bargains in their home-buying negotia-
tions.28 The Court thereby lowered the economic-loss-rule boom on the
plaintiffs' claims.
The unnerving aspect of this landmark case2 9 is that the plaintiffs
were not in privity with the concrete manufacturer's contract with the
general contractor.3 ° Therefore, the plaintiffs could not have bargained
for the salinity content in the concrete. They were without a remedy -
whether in contract 31 or tort32 - because they should have bartered bet-
ter in their home buying.33
Justice Barkett dissented, acknowledging this catch-22. She argued
that the plaintiffs' lack of privity with the concrete manufacturer was a
fact which should have permitted them to circumvent the economic loss
rule because the rule's purpose would not be furthered by its application
24. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246 (quoting Barrett, supra note 23) (citations omitted).
25. See id. at 1245.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 1247.
29. See Geri Lynn Mankoff, Florida's Economic Loss Rule: Will it Devour Fraud in the
Inducement Claims When Only Economic Damages Are at Stake? 21 NOVA L. REv. 467, 469, 473
(1996); Paul J. Schweip, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The Monster That Ate Commercial
Torts, 69 FLA. B.J. 34, 38 (1995).
30. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1245.
31. The plaintiffs' breach of warranty claims were dismissed for lack of privity. See id. at
1248 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
32. The court barred their tort claim based upon the economic loss rule. See id. at 1248.
33. See id. at 1247.
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in this case.34 In Barkett's analysis, the economic loss rule's underlying
principle was that parties in a business context have the ability to allo-
cate economic risks and remedies as part of their contractual negotia-
tions."5 Based upon their lack of privity with the manufacturer, the
plaintiffs did not possess this ability.36
Justice Shaw also dissented, but on a different theory. 37 Granting
that "under a negligence theory, purely economic loss cannot be recov-
ered by parties to a contract when the loss is to the property that is the
subject-of the contract," 38 Justice Shaw did not see the necessary basis in
Casa Clara for applying the doctrine. His argument was that the plain-
tiffs' injuries were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant concrete
manufacturer and, notwithstanding privity, they should have been per-
mitted to recover from the defendant's defective product as "innocent
third parties," having been injured by a defective product.39
Consequently, the majority's catch-22 leached into the two dissent-
ing opinions, one arguing that the rule's purpose would not be furthered
by such an application, the other arguing that reasonable foreseeability
should have permitted the imposition of liability on the defendant for
injuries sustained by innocent third parties.
The majority in Casa Clara twice cited AFM Corp. v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,4° wherein the Florida Supreme Court
stated that "without some conduct resulting in personal injury or prop-
erty damage, there can be no independent tort flowing from a contractual
breach which would justify a tort claim solely for economic losses."41
Noting that each of these cases was brought as a negligence based tort
claim, the Florida Supreme Court's strong language led lower Florida
courts to bar similar negligence-based claims where there existed a con-
tract between the parties and the plaintiffs had suffered no physical
injury or property damages. However, even the majority could not have
foreseen that the Casa Clara catch-22, in lieu of AFM Corp.'s seem-
ingly categorical use of the economic loss rule, would have resulted in
fraud-based intentional torts also falling prey to the rule.4 2 Lower Flor-
34. See id. 1248 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 1248 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1249.
40. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
41. Id. at 181-82.
42. See Hoseline v. U.S.A., 40 F.3d 1198 (11 th Cir. 1995) (finding that the economic loss rule
bars action for fraud and civil theft based upon breach of contract); Richard Swaebe, Inc. v. Sears
World Trade, Inc., 639 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (reversing awards of punitive damages and fraud
because of the economic loss rule).
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ida courts began to routinely dismiss intentional tort claims where the
only damages suffered were pecuniary and there was a contract between
the parties addressing the subject matter of the fraud. Consequently, this
issue repeatedly found its way into law review journals as Florida courts
(state and federal alike) began to utilize the economic loss rule to dis-
member fraud in the inducement of a contract as a claim independent
from the breach of contract.
A. Fraud in the Inducement of a Contract
Florida's common law fraud in the inducement of a contract as a
tort theory as rooted in over 800 years of English common law.43 It
represents an abuse of the contract bargaining process in general and has
been seen as a "wrong" characteristic of tort law.' It does not sound in
contract partly because it arises before the terms of the contract are
defined.45 Nonetheless, contract law treastises cannot avoid the topic of
fraud in the inducement due to its close relation to contract law. At least
one contract law writer classifies its elements as: (1) an assertion that is
not in accord with the facts; (2) which is fraudulent (intentional) in
nature and related to a material issue; (3) which assertion is relied upon
by the recipient; and (4) upon which reliance must be justifiable.4 6 The
Florida Supreme Court has held that the recipient of an assertion "may
rely on the truth of a representation, even though its falsity could have
been ascertained had he made an investigation, unless he knows the rep-
resentation to be false or its falsity is obvious to him."' 47 The Supreme
Court has articulated the essential elements of a fraudulent misrepresen-
tation as "(1) a false statement concerning a material fact; (2) the
representor's knowledge that the representation is false; (3) an intention
that the representation induce another to act on it; and, (4) consequent
injury by the party acting in reliance on the representation.
48
43. See Woodson v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 1327, 1330 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (Altenbemd, J.,
dissenting).
44. See WADE, supra note 19, at 1013.
45. For a more extensive explanation of this statement, see infra notes 49-51 and
accompanying text.
46. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 4.12, at 260. Farnsworth notes that a "close question
may be presented if the recipient made an independent investigation of the fact asserted" but
distinguishes between an instance where the recipient relies solely upon her own investigation and
a case where the "investigation tended to confirm the misrepresentation but was somewhat
inconclusive."
47. Besett v. Basnett, 389 So.2d 995, 997 (Fla. 1980) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 540-41 (1976)) (emphasis added). Stated another way, the recipient of an asserted fact
is not under a duty to discover an affirmative misrepresentation made by the one asserting it.
48. Johnson v. Davis, 480 So.2d 625, 627 (Fla. 1985).
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1. "OOPS! I JUST MADE A CONTRACT!"
To find the proper place for fraudulent inducement, whether in tort
law or contract law, it is essential to distinguish between classic and
modem contract theories. Contrary to the classic view of contracts 49,
modem contract law, largely relying on the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, does not look for a
particular time when the contract suddenly exists and immediately
before which time it did not.50 Classic contract theory looked for a defi-
nite offer and an expression of acceptance, without which a contract
could not exist.51 Prior to the acceptance of an offer, the parties were in
a stage of pre-contract negotiation during which no contractual duties
had yet arisen between them. They were, however, as subjected to tort
duties as they would have been to all other persons, irrespective of
whether a contract resulted from the negotiation process.
Under the classic view, fraudulent inducement of a contract fit
neatly as a tort theory, separate and independent from contract, because
the alleged fraud occurs prior to the existence of any contractual duties.
Thus, parties alleging fraud in the inducement were in fact alleging a
wrong which arose prior to the contract, the result of which was the
contract which the complaining party usually had partly performed with-
out the anticipated performance from the opposing party.
In contrast, modem contract theory has interwoven the negotiation
process into the process of contract. It arguably has eliminated the
moment of the "making" of a contract. To best illustrate this, one need
look no further than article 2 of the UCC5 2 or to the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts.5 3 For example, the UCC has cast aside the pre-requi-
site of finding the "moment of [a contract's] making" before finding that
a contract exists.54 Contract generally is perceived as a process under
this modem view and encompasses negotiation, performance, and
enforcement. Modem statutes that follow the UCC allow for interpreta-
tion of the terms of an agreement by looking to the course of the parties'
performance. 55  Comment 1 to section 2-208 of the UCC notes, "The
49. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, §§ 3.1-3.5, at 112-18.
50. See STUART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 193-94 (1995). Macaulay
et al., note that the Restatement (Second) of Contracts "invites courts to abandon the old religion
and follow the [Uniform Commercial] Code's approach in areas other than sales of goods where
Article 2 applies." Id. at 194.
51. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 3.6, at 118-120.
52. See U.C.C. § 2-208 (1990).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33.
54. See U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.204(2) (West 1993).
55. See U.C.C. § 2-208 (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.208 (West 1993); see also Lalow v.
Codomo, 101 So.2d 390, 393 (Fla. 1958) ("the actions of the parties may be considered as a
means of determining the interpretation that they themselves have placed upon the contract");
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parties themselves know best what they have meant by the their words
of agreement and their action under that agreement is the best indication
of what that meaning was."5 6
Even more provacative in modem contract theory than course of
performance is the UCC's introduction of course of dealing. 7 Where
course of performance is used to interpret what the parties intended in
their past agreement, course of dealing looks forward with the proactive
effect of coloring the future negotiation process. 8 Section 1-205(1) of
the UCC states that "[a] course of dealing is a sequence of previous
conduct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to
be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for inter-
preting their expressions and other conduct."59
Therefore, conduct and conversations during the negotiation pro-
cess are not inconsequential to the interpretation of the resulting con-
tract. However, even under the modem view, these issues are addressed
in terms of contract doctrine. Consequently, contract treatises now
address the negotiation process and negotiation-based topics such as
fraudulent inducement. This raises the questions of whether modem
contract principles, having interwoven the negotiation phase into the
process of contract, also has usurped fraudulent inducement from tort
law, and whether the economic loss rule is merely the doctrinal expres-
sion of this modernization.
2. "I KNOW YOU THINK YOU KNOW WHAT I PROMISED."
Fraud in the inducement is addressed in contract law for yet another
reason. When a bargaining party intentionally misleads the negotiation
process by asserting untrue facts, his actions may be interpreted as mak-
ing promises which he never intended to keep. Thus, if a contract actu-
ally is formed, it is nonetheless doomed before the parties undertake any
performance and the defrauded party's expectation will be disappointed.
John E. Murray Jr., The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1307,
1314 (Oct. 1986) (arguing that "[b]ecause the [contracting] parties should be permitted to modify
their factual bargain without technical interference, their course of performance not only will
provide the strongest evidence of their contract's intended meaning; it also will operate to
overcome their previously expressed terms") (citing U.C.C. § 2-208(2) (1990)).
56. U.C.C. § 2-208, cmt. 1 (1990); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.208 cmt. 1 (West 1993).
57. See U.C.C. § 1-205 (1990); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.205 (West 1993).
58. See id.
59. Id.; see also Kiwanis Club of Little Havanna v. Kalafe, 723 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA
1998) (holding that a written contract can be modified by subsequent oral agreement between the
parties or by the parties' course of dealing.); see also Aremana G. Bennett, Diminishing Returns:
Doing Without a Provision for Implied Warranty Disclaimers Through Dealing, Performance and
Usage, 41 CLEV. ST. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1993).
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This observation raises the question as to whether the recipient of a false
representation has a contract claim, tort claim, or both.
It has been held by at least one Florida court that the mere promise
to perform X, along with a specific intent to not perform X, is sufficient
to plead fraudulent inducement if the promise induced the recipient to
enter an agreement.60 The only difference between that scenario and the
simplest form of willful breach of a contract, which has been held by
Florida courts to not amount to a fraud claim,6 1 is the presence of spe-
cific intent during the negotiation process. This requires a turn in the
analysis to a determination of what assurances the parties to that negoti-
ation phase may claim under the law.
For example, if the court follows the modern contract view as
espoused by the UCC and adopted by Florida's legislature, then the
negotiation phase is to be considered part of the overall contract process.
Therefore, wrongs committed during that phase might be best addressed
in a contract claim, if a contract resulted from the negotiations. If, on
the other hand, a court is willing to separate the negotiation process from
the contract itself, then based upon classic contract theory, it could rely
on the fact that the wrong was committed before any contract existed.
Under the classic theory, tort law properly applies because no contract
was in existence at the precise time the wrongs were committed. In
addition to the tort claim, any resulting breach of contract could be
addressed by traditional contract remedies, including any remedial
clauses found in the written agreement.
It is apparent from the above discussion that, with both tort law and
contract law bearing down upon a fraud in the inducement claim, each
bringing with them their attendant public policies and foundational prin-
ciples, the question as to which should govern overlapping issues has
become difficult to answer. Fraud in the inducement, however, must be
distinguished from fraud in the performance. The latter is by no means a
tort claim, and the line between the two is not always so easily
perceived.
B. Fraud in the Performance of a Contract
Fraud in the inducement must be carefully distinguished from fraud
in the performance of a contract. Alleged fraud in the performance of a
contract, which cannot be fairly distinguished from a willful breach of
the contract, remains barred by the economic loss rule.62 For example,
60. See Century Property, Inc., v. Machtinger, 448 So. 2d 570, 572-73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
61. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 938 F. Supp. 820, 824 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
62. See Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Bullington Lumber Co., 968 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D.
Fla. 1997).
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in Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Bullington Lumber Co., a lumber
distributor asserted a fraud claim against a lumber manufacturer for
"strawberry packing" lumber shipped to the distributor.63 The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Florida applied state law and held
that this activity, though fraudulent, did not constitute a fraud which
could independently support a tort claim.64 In fact, the contract between
the distributor and the manufacturer specifically addressed the quality of
lumber to be delivered.65 The court precluded the distributor's fraud
claim against the manufacturer citing the economic loss rule as a bar to
suit.
6 6
The Dantzler court also noted that the distributor failed to allege
any wrongful acts by the manufacturer which were not specifically
addressed in the contract between them. Rather, this claim was a "fraud
claim, 'where the only misrepresentation by the dishonest party con-
cem[ed] the quality or character of the goods sold .... , ,67 The court
concluded that the claim was barred by the economic loss rule because
the contract addressed the very wrong (breach) which the plaintiff
alleged as an intentional tort.
The Dantzler court upheld the following three principles in Florida
law regarding tort claims that may survive independently of contract
remedies. First, "the intentional acts must be independent from the acts
that breached the contract. '68 Second, a plaintiffs fraud claim is barred
by the economic loss rule if the facts surrounding the tort claim are
"interwoven" with the facts surrounding the breach of contract claim. 69
Finally, an independent tort "requires proof of facts separate and distinct
from the breach of contract."7 °
The Dantzler court then established a test to determine whether a
fraud claim "revolves around the performance of the contract."7 The
court concluded that "if claims relate to fraud in the performance, the
63. Id. at 1544-45. "Strawberry packing" occurs when unacceptable or non-conforming
lumber is hidden inside a layer of good lumber making it impossible to see the poorer-quality
lumber. In this case the distributor shipped the lumber to its customers and did not discover the
manufacturer's fraudulent performance until it was brought to their attention by their customers.
64. See id. at 1546.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1548.
67. Id. at 1546 (quoting Huron Tool & Engineering CO. v. Precision Consulting Servs., 532
N.W.2d 544, 545 (Mich. 1995)). Huron Tool was cited with apparent approval by the Florida
Supreme Court in HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1239, 1240 (Fla.
1996).
68. AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1987).
69. See Serina v. Albertson's, Inc., 744 F.Supp. 1113, 1117-18 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
70. HTP, Ltd., 685 So. 2d at 1239.
71. Dantzler Lumber & Export Co., 968 F.Supp. at 1546 (citing HTP, Ltd., 685 So. 2d at
1240).
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economic loss rule will preclude fraud recovery .... Even allegations
that the fraud induced the plaintiff to perform additional acts and incur
additional expenses will not raise the fraud to an acceptable level of
independence.'T
A particularly salient articulation of why fraud in the performance
of a contract is limited to contractual remedies was provided by the
Southern District of Florida in McCutcheon v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.73
That court stated that:
[w]here a contract exists, and a plaintiff asserts a claim for fraud in
the breach, this is essentially the equivalent of a claim that the breach
was willful. A claim for willful breach of contract is still a claim for
breach of contract, and does not give rise to tort remedies, e.g., puni-
tive damages, no matter how oppressive the breach.74
This is not to imply that independent torts that arise alongside a
breach of contract are not recoverable. What the courts will seek are
separate elements in these causes of action based upon separate facts
which are not so closely "intertwoven" with the breach of contract as to
make them merely part of the breach itself.75 The Southern District of
Florida drew this distinction in Future Tech International, Inc., v. Tae II
Media, Ltd.,7 6 where it observed that the mere existence of a contract
claim "does not automatically vitiate all causes of action in tort."77
Thus, even though contractual remedies must be sought to recover for
claims that expressly or essentially seek damages for economic losses
attendant to breach of contract, a plaintiff does not face an absolute bar
to tort claims. The Future Tech court found it necessary to separate tort
and contract law from each other in order to:
foster the reliability of commercial transactions. Where the parties
have limited liability and allocated risk by agreement, tort remedies
should not be allowed to supersede the parties' prior understanding of
the consequences of deficient performance. Contractual duties are
imposed by agreement between the parties; the scope of those duties
and liability in the event of their breach is limited by the agreement.
Tort duties, by contrast, are imposed by society, may not always be
limited by the understanding of the parties, and can give rise to more
punitive remedies if a breach occurs. As observed by the Eleventh
72. Dantzler, 968 F.Supp. at 1546 (citing HTP, Ltd., 685 So. 2d at 1240 (citing Williams
Elec. Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1225, 1238 (N.D. Fla. 1991))).
73. 938 F. Supp. 820 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
74. Id. at 824 (citing Leisure Founders, Inc. v. CUC Int'l., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1562, 1572 (S.D.
Fla. 1993).
75. See Leisure Founders, 833 F. Supp. at 1572.
76. 944 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
77. Id. at 1566 (citing Kee v. National Reserve Life Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 1538, 1543 (1 1th Cir.
1990)).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:505
Circuit, however, "[t]ort claims can be appropriate under Florida law
where there is some wrongful conduct which amounts to an
independent tort in addition to the conduct resulting in the contractual
breach."78
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court in AFM Corp. v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,79 noted that "a breach of contract,
alone, cannot constitute a cause of action in tort .... It is only when the
breach of contract is attended by some additional conduct which
amounts to an independent tort that such breach can constitute
negligence. '"80
III. CLEARING THE FIELDS ON FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT
After Casa Clara8 and AFM Corp,82 Florida courts began to sig-
nificantly diverge on the question as to whether the economic loss rule
would bar a claim for fraud in the inducement of a contract. 83 In partic-
ular, two opposing appellate court decisions came to the Florida
Supreme Court in 1995.84 One common issue presented was whether
fraud in the inducement was barred by the economic loss rule.
Theoretically speaking, if a party misrepresents material facts and
induces another to enter a commercial agreement, then the victim of that
fraud is likely to suffer only economic damages. 85 Notwithstanding the
economic loss rule, which obviously is implicated by such a fraud, it is
also likely that the induced agreement substantially addresses the subject
matter of the fraud and may even offer contractually based remedies. At
78. Future Tech, 944 F. Supp. at 1566 (citing Kee, 918 F.2d at 1543). It is important to recall
that even when courts speak in absolute terms of allocating risks by agreement among contracting
parties, that tort duties owed to the public do in fact supercede duties to other individuals as
agreed in a contract. For instance, duties imposed by illegal contracts will not be enforced by
courts because the duty owed to the public is higher than the duty arising by the agreement. But,
these are recognized as exceptions to the rule favoring enforcement of the parties' agreement. See
also FARNSWORTH supra note 16 § 5.1, at 345-50.
79. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
80. Id. at 181.
81. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).
82. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
83. See Mankoff, supra note 29, at 468-88; Schweip, supra note 29, at 40.
84. See HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 661 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA
1995); Woodson v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
85. This is not to say that physical injury or property damage cannot result from fraudulent
inducement. For example, if a seller fraudulently represents that a plane is flight worthy and
another relies on that misrepresentation and buys the plane and if the plane crashes injuring the
buyer, the buyer has suffered more than economic damages. In that scenario, the economic loss
rule would not apply because of the physical injuries. Most fraudulent commercial transactions
that become appellate fodder lack the physical injury or property damage components, thus the
fraudulent inducement controversy revolves around fact patterns disimilar to the defective plane
illustration.
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first blush, Casa Clara and AFM Corp, seem to limit the defrauded
party to contractual remedies.
The first of the two appellate decisions was the Third District's in
HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A. .86 The court was con-
fronted with a claim that the defendants had fraudulently induced the
plaintiff into a negotiated settlement agreement.87 The Third District
permitted the claim irrespective of the fact that only economic losses
were pled.88 It was likely that the plaintiff could not allege any loss
other than the missed opportunity to collect more damages due to the
defendants' fraud during the settlement negotiations. Such a claim
could hardly be characterized as anything but a prayer for relief for
purely economic loss. As a result, the opinion was peculiarly devoid of
facts and perhaps designedly so. Consequently, the plaintiff's claim
could have been characterized as little more than disappointed
expectations.
In finding that the claim was not barred by the economic loss rule,
the Third District reached beyond the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in
Casa Clara to find one of its own earlier precedents, Burton v. Linotype
Co. 9 In that case, the Third District held "Fraud in the inducement and
deceit are independent torts for which compensatory and punitive dam-
ages may be recovered."90
Notwithstanding the Third District's doctrinal basis for its holding,
it cannot be overlooked that HTP involved a settlement agreement. 9'
Because courts must approve negotiated settlement agreements,92 the
Third District may have been reacting to what it perceived as fraud upon
the court.93
Two months after HTP, the Second District Court of Appeal
reached an opposite conclusion in Woodson v. Martin.94 Whereas the
86. 661 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1222.
89. 556 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
90. Id. at 1128.
91. See HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1238-39 (Fla.
1996).
92. For an example of the way Florida courts have handled settlement agreement approvals
see, Peterson v. Morton F. Plant Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 656 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (involving
settlement agreement entered into by personal representatives of patient's estate in malpractice
action against hospital) and Cohen v. Cohen, 629 So. 2d 909,910 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (approving
oral settlement agreement announced in open court in marriage dissolution proceedings).
93. This fact may or may not be significant considering this case's companion, Woodson v.
Martin, was addressed by the Florida Supreme Court at the same time. Woodson constituted a
standard fraud in the inducement claim without the settlement wrinkle. 663 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1995).
94. See id at 1327.
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HTP appellate court overlooked Casa Clara entirely, the Woodson
appellate court followed the Casa Clara reasoning and read AFM Corp.
as eliminating all independent tort claims which flowed from a contrac-
tual breach absent some physical injury or property damage.95
In HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., Justice Shaw,
writing on behalf of the Florida Supreme Court, held that the broad posi-
tions articulated in Casa Clara and AFM did not preclude fraud in the
inducement as a viable tort claim.96 Rather, fraud in the inducement
exists irrespective of a breach of contract claim.9 7 Recall that Justice
Shaw dissented in Casa Clara, arguing that the reasonable foreseeability
of harm to innocent third parties not in privity should have permitted the
third parties to circumvent the economic loss rule.98
Woodson, in contrast to HTP, involved a claim of fraud in the sale
of real property, not entirely unlike Casa Clara. Additionally, the
Woodson appellate court noted that the parties had agreed that the lower
court's reasoning in barring the claim was based upon language in Casa
Clara. The Second District followed the lower court's lead and quoted
extreme (and overbroad) language from Casa Clara which, if intended
to be followed in this manner, had the effect of virtually destroying fraud
in the inducement and many other intentional tort claims that purely
economic damages. 99
The Woodson majority, quoting from Casa Clara, argued that:
economic losses are 'disappointed economic expectations' which are
protected by contract law rather than tort law .... [T]his is the basic
difference between contract law, which protects expectations, and tort
law, which is determined by the duty owed to an injured party ....
[F]or a recovery in tort 'there must be a showing of harm above and
beyond disappointed expectations. 
0
As for a test to determine whether the economic loss rule should
apply, the Woodson majority continued, "We believe that the nature of
the damages suffered determines whether the economic loss rule bars
recovery based on tort theories. If the damages sought are economic
losses only, the party seeking recovery for those damages must proceed
on contract theories of liability."101
95. See id. at 1329 (quoting Airport Rent-A-Car v. Prevost Car Inc., 660 So. 2d 628, 632 (Fla.
1995) (quoting AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla. 1987))).
96. See HTP, Ltd., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 1996).
97. See id. at 1239.
98. See Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244,
1248-49 (Fla. 1993).
99. See Woodson, 663 So. 2d at 1328.
100. Id. (quoting Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246).
101. Woodson, 663 So. 2d at 1329.
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Essentially, the Second District framed the question in a way that
assumed the answer. Its test asked, if economic losses are precluded
from tort recovery in the absence of physical injury or property damage,
should fraud in the inducement be barred by the economic loss rule
where damages from the fraud are purely economic losses? In this anal-
ysis, there is no distinction between negligence-based tort claims and
intentional tort claims, even though tort law traditionally distinguishes
the damages available under the two different theories.
10 2
Using this test, and answering in the affirmative, the Second Dis-
trict, sitting en banc, affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the claim. 1
0 3
Thus, the Second District extended an overly broad Casa Clara ruling to
bar fraud in the inducement when the only tort damages claimed were
pecuniary.
Judge Altenbemd dissented from the Woodson majority opinion
arguing that the economic loss rule should not apply to intentional
torts." He noted that "[a]n action for deceit has existed at common law
since 1201 1°5 and traced the modem common law of fraud to the 1789
case Pasley v. Freeman.0 6 Because both Casa Clara and AFM Corp
were negligence actions where no intentional tort claims were asserted,
the language in those cases which the majority seized upon to obliterate
all "independent tort" theories need not be read so broadly." 7
Judge Altenbemd also made a useful observation, arguing that there
existed three separate theories of the economic loss rule, none of which
necessarily precluded recovery for intentional torts such as fraud in the
inducement.1 0 8 He noted that, first, there were Florida cases which
espoused a "products liability economic loss rule: If the defendant's
product physically damages only itself, causing additional economic
loss, no recovery is permitted in 'tort."" 0 9  Second, he observed that
Florida has a "contract economic loss rule: If the parties have entered
into a contract, the obligations of the contract cannot be relied upon to
102. Florida law permits both punitive and nominal damages in intentional tort cases but
precludes them in negligence-based suits. See Ciamar Marcy, Inc. v. Monteiro Da Costa, 508 So.
2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (awarding punitive damages in intentional tort cases);
Guthartz v. Lewis, 408 So. 2d 600, 602 n. 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) aff'd 428 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1982)
(awarding nominal damages in intentional tort cases); White Const. Co., Inc. v. Dupont, 455 So.
2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 1984) (stating that something more than gross negligence is required to permit
punitive damages).
103. See Woodson, 663 So. 2d at 1329.
104. See id. at 1331.
105. Id. at 1330.
106. See id. (citing Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term Rep. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (1789)).
107. Woodson, 663 So. 2d at 1330.
108. See id. at 1331.
109. Id. (citing Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d
1244 (Fla. 1993)).
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establish a cause of action in tort for the recovery of purely economic
damages."11 Finally, he defined a "negligence economic loss rule:
Common law negligence will not be expanded to protect economic inter-
ests in the absence of personal injury or property damage unless the
judiciary is convinced that a strong public policy requires an expansion
of the common law to protect specific economic interests." '111
According to Judge Altenbernd, none of these theories necessarily
require that the economic loss rule be extended to intentional torts such
as fraud in the inducement of a contract.I12 He argued that if the major-
ity's reasoning was correct in its reliance on Casa Clara and AFM Corp,
then "both fraud and negligent misrepresentation have been essentially
abolished in Florida."
'1 13
The moral of the story here is that two esteemed District Courts of
Appeal came to vastly different conclusions about the viability of a fraud
in the inducement claim where the recovery sought was for purely eco-
nomic losses. The supreme court's reasoning on this issue came in
answer to the defendants' appeal from the Third District's ruling in HTP
Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A. .114 The appellants-defend-
ants argued that because the plaintiffs failed to plead or prove any physi-
cal injury or property damage, their fraud in the inducement tort claims
were precluded by the economic loss rule based upon AFM Corp.'15
In response to this argument, Justice Shaw stated unequivocally
that:
[t]he economic loss rule has not eliminated causes of action based
upon torts independent of the contractual breach even though there
exists a breach of contract action. Where a contract exists, a tort
action will lie for either intentional or negligent acts considered to be
independent from acts that breached the contract."
'1 16
The court also noted that AFM implicitly allowed for this result where in
that opinion the court stated that "AFM has not proved that a tort
independent of the breach itself was committed. Consequently, we find
110. Woodson, 663 So. 2d at 1331 (citing AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. 515 So.
2d 180 (Fla. 1987)).
111. Woodson, 663 So. 2d at 1331 (citing Palau Int'l Traders, Inc. v. Narcam Aircraft, Inc.,
653 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)).
112. See Woodson, 663 So. 2d at 1331.
113. Id.
114. 685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996). The Second DCA's ruling barring the tort claim was
quashed without opinion in Woodson v. Martin, 685 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1996).
115. See HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238 (citing AFM Corp
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987)).
116. HTP, Ltd., 685 So. 2d at 1239 (citing Ferguson Transp., Inc. v. North Am. Van Lines,
Inc., 662 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)) (emphasis in original).
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no basis for recovery in negligence." '117
The court, on the basis of both fact and law, went on to explain why
fraud in the inducement is an independent tort. Factually, fraud in the
inducement "requires proof of facts separate and distinct from the breach
of contract." ' Doctrinally, the court, quoting Judge Altenbemd's dis-
senting opinion in Woodson with approval, noted that fraud in the
inducement of a contract "normally 'occurs prior to the contract and the
standard of truthful representation placed upon the defendant is not
derived from the contract."' 1 19
The Supreme Court of Florida also adopted the analysis of the
Michigan Supreme Court in Huron Tool & Engineering Co. v. Precision
Consulting Services, Inc.,12° where it was reasoned that fraud in the
inducement creates a special situation where "the ability of one party to
negotiate fair terms and make an informed decision is undermined by
the other party's fraudulent behavior."1 2 1  Therefore, because of the
fraud, there is no freely negotiated contract to force the parties (and the
court) to look to the contractual terms should there be a later breach.
The court concluded with a final approval of Judge Altenbernd's dis-
senting opinion below in Woodson quoting that:
the interest protected by fraud is society's need for true factual state-
ments in important human relationships, primarily commercial or
business relationships. More specifically, the interest protected by
fraud is a plaintiff s right to justifiably rely on the truth of a defend-
ant's factual representation in a situation where an intentional lie
would result in loss to the plaintiff. Generally, the plaintiff s loss is a
purely economic loss. 22
However, reliance on these other decisions left several questions
unanswered. First, should every fraud in the inducement claim be con-
sidered an independent cause of action, separate from any breach of the
117. HTP, Ltd., 685 So. 2d at 1239 (quoting AFM, 515 So. 2d at 181) (emphasis in original).
118. HTP, Ltd., 685 So. 2d at 1239.
119. Id. (quoting Woodson, 663 So. 2d at 1331 (Altenbemd, J., dissenting)). It should be noted
that the Florida Supreme Court has apparently, in HTP, reverted from modem contract theory,
where the negotiation phase is part and parcel of the contracting process, to the classic view of
contracts. See supra notes 113, 49-51 and accompanying text. As previously mentioned, Florida,
having adopted both the U.C.C. and many principles of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
now routinely follows modem contract theory. Here, however, the Supreme Court of Florida
states that it is significant that the fraud inducing the contract at issue occured "prior to the
contract" and that the standard of truthful representation to be applied is "not derived from the
contract." HTP, Ltd., 685 So. 2d at 1239. These are words characteristic of classic, not modem,
contract theory.
120. 532 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. 1995).
121. HTP, Ltd., 685 So. 2d at 1239-40 (quoting Huron Tool, 532 N.W.2d at 545).
122. HTP, Ltd., 685 So. 2d at 1240 (quoting Woodson, 663 So. 2d at 1330 (Altenbernd, J.,
dissenting)).
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contract? That is, should the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in
HTP be read to hold that fraud in the inducement of a contract is an
independent tort theory and therefore is not precluded by the economic
loss rule? Or, are there some cases where the fraud may be so closely
intertwined with the performance or the terms of the contract itself that
the "defrauded" party has arguably agreed that the contract remedies
will be exclusive?
Additionally, the Supreme Court in HTP argued that it is the free
and fair negotiation in the formation of a contract which protects con-
tracting parties in the allocation of their respective losses in a venture.'1
2 3
Does this mean that if the parties have bargained for a remedy to protect
against a suspected element of fraud the court will upset the parties'
choice of remedy? If the answer to that question is "yes," then how is
the court not requiring that a party remain naive in negotiation (and
therefore exposed to a substantial economic loss due to potential fraud)
in order to retain a judicial remedy? The remaining portion of this arti-
cle explores these issues.
IV. FREE TO BE STUCK, STUCK WITH YOUR CHOICE, CHOOSING
A REMEDY
As mentioned in Part II, contract law must be analyzed when con-
sidering fraud in the inducement of a contract. Not many would argue
that courts that provide a remedy for misrepresentation and fraud act
contrary to contract law generally. This is due largely to the sense that
freedom to contract is a virtue that promotes healthy commercial activ-
ity. However, this virtue only flows without restriction when all parties
to a contract understand the risks and facts surrounding an agreement.
In the ideal world, contracts are most effective as a means of stabilizing
business transactions when there is mutual assent.' 24 Assent, however,
implies knowledge of facts that underly the promises the parties are will-
ing to commit themselves to, even if their bargain does not reap them the
great profit they expect.
Much of traditional contract law views contracting parties as nego-
tiating their respective bargains at arms length. In an arms-length trans-
action it is more difficult for the parties to interpret the words and
intentions of their opponents during the negotiation process. Interpreta-
tion is contextual and depends in part upon each party's ability to trust
her own assessment of the other's spoken intentions. The context neces-
sary to make these assessments often is lacking in an arms length agree-
ment. For instance, such discrete transactions may make it considerably
123. See HTP, Ltd., 685 So. 2d at 1239-40.
124. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 16 §§ 3.6-3.8, at 118-33.
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more difficult for each party to determine whether the other has a reputa-
tion for standing by her word. As a result, parties may find it necessary
to cautiously approach each other as they attempt to consider every pos-
sible eventuality from their relationship. They ultimately seek to come
away with what they perceive to be a complete and beneficial agreement
from their own perspective.
In an arms-length transaction between two companies largely unfa-
miliar with one another, the parties will not have established a rapport
justifying significant mutual trust. They may sense a greater need to
protect themselves from economic loss in the event that one is advantag-
ing itself with pertinent information unknown to the other. In many
instances, such unknown information remains undisclosed even after the
parties have performed and parted ways.
The law only takes notice of their contractual relationship when it
is wrecked and needs sorting out. This is an expensive and time con-
suming process for all concerned. To avoid this expense, the law
imposes two separate forms of protection for parties to a contract. The
first kind, which originates in tort law, is imposed on all individuals
whether they are contracting parties or not.1 25 The second is imposed by
the contracting parties on one another by the terms and clauses of their
mutual agreements. Contract law provides this protection in the con-
cepts of warranties, liquidated damages, recission and reformation provi-
sions, subsequent agreements to amend the terms, and the like.
126
But what should the law do when bargained-for-remedies expressly
deal with an aspect of the agreement which was also the substance of a
fraud inducing the contract? For example, if the parties have bargained
for a liquidated damages clause to attempt to protect themselves from
potential fraud and that fraud is perpetrated, should the "defrauded"
party be restricted to the negotiated remedy?
This section first considers the basic operation and principles
underlying the law on liquidated damages in Florida. Second, it dis-
cusses whether a fraud in the inducement claim should avail the
defrauded party of compensatory and punitive damages despite available
contractual remedies. Third, whether there is a valid fraud in the induce-
ment claim where ther is actually a free negotiation for the liquidated
damages clause. Finally, whether a liquidated damages clause aimed at
a term later discovered to be the subject of the fraud should be success-
125. For example, consider the duty of good faith and fair dealing. See e.g., Green Companies
Inc., of Fla. v. Kendall Racquetball Investments, Ltd., 560 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981)).
126. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, §§ 12.1-12.20, at 839, 955.
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ful in pulling the tort claim into the contract and require resolution under
contract principles.
A. A Summary of Florida's Law on Liquidated Damages
Florida jurisprudence recognizes the right of contracting parties to
agree to a liquidated damages clause that supplies the exclusive remedy
for specified breaches.127 The parties may stipulate in advance to an
amount to be paid or retained as liquidated damages in the event of a
breach. However, for contracting parties to succeed in choosing such a
remedy, the parties and the circumstances in which the clause would
operate must meet certain requirements. 28
The Florida Supreme Court has stated that two conditions must be
satisfied: "First, the damages consequent upon a breach must not be
readily ascertainable.' 29 Second, the sum stipulated to be forfeited must
not be so grossly disproportionate to any damages that might reasonably
be expected to follow from a breach as to show that the parties could
have intended only to induce full performance, rather than to liquidate
their damages."'
130
The second prong of the test is essentially the court's proscription
of penalty clauses. 13  The common law has remained particularly defi-
ant of a stipulated remedial clause that acts as a penalty in the event of a
breach. This is due largely to contract law's distaste for casting moral
127. See Mayor's Jeweler's Inc. v. State of Cal. Public Employee's Retirement Sys., 685 So.
2d 904, 907 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (stating that Florida law holds that it is possible for contracting
parties to agree to a liquidated damages clause that supplies the exclusive remedy for specified
breaches.); Coastal Computer Corp. v. Team Management Sys. Inc., 624 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1993) (stating that parties to a contract may stipulate to what the consequences of a breach
of the agreement will be.); Hatcher v. Panama City Nursing Ctr. Inc., 461 So. 2d 288, 290 (Fla.
1st DCA 1985) (stating that there is a general principle of law that parties to a contract may
stipulate what the consequences of a breach shall be and if the stipulation is reasonable, it will
control and exclude all other consequences.); Dillard Homes Inc. v. Carroll, 152 So. 2d 738 (Fla.
3d DCA 1963).
128. See Lefemine v. Baron, 573 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1991).
129. In the hypothetical posited by this article, Jane Acquiror would counter Bob Owner's
attempt to limit her damages with the liquidated damages clause by arguing that the contract
lacked this first element required by Florida law. If she could demonstrate that the Owner knew
of the concealed fraudulent government contracts then she would also probably be able to
establish that her damages resulting from a breach of the contract were readily ascertainable to the
Owner. If successful, she would then argue that the liquidated damages clause should be ruled
unenforceable as a matter of law.
Although this would support her claim for contract (calculated as the difference between the
contract price and the true value), it would not support her tort claim. She still would be
precluded in contract from recovering her preparation damages and punitive damages. She must
convince the court to permit her to plead tort claims independently in order to recover those
damages.
130. Lefemine, 573 So. 2d at 328.
131. See id.
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blame on a breaching party and its generally permissive attitude toward
the "efficient breach of contract."
1 32
In some cases, the second prong of this test has been characterized
as a proscription of "unconscionable" liquidated damages clauses.
133
The difference (and the difficulty) arises when it becomes necessary to
predict from which perspective the court will view the reasonableness of
the clause.
If the court focuses on the clause from the "time of contracting,"
reasonableness may require little more than a rationally based relation-
ship to the subject matter of the contract terms and a desire to legiti-
mately liquidate their damages.1 34 This fits well with the concept of
projected damages being "not readily ascertainable" at the time of con-
tracting. 135 Under this analysis, the court asks whether the sum to be
paid is "disproportionate to the probable injury likely to result from a
breach of the contract."
1 36
If, on the other hand, the court decides reasonableness from the
time of breach and designates it "unconscionable," 1 37 then it has
demanded that the parties perform an entirely different calculation dur-
ing the negotiation process. Essentially, the parties would have been
required to predict an amount of damages the court would not permit
their clause to exceed even though that sum is admittedly "not readily
ascertainable." 138 This balance is difficult to achieve when drafting a
liquidated damages clause. 139 Nevertheless, if the liquidated damages
provision in question fails either of the two prongs, the court will declare
it "void as a matter of law and unenforceable."" 4
A successfully drafted liquidated damages clause can be an effec-
tive way for parties to estimate their future damages and avoid costly
132. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16 § 12.3 & n.3, at 847.
133. Berndt v. Bieberstein, 465 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
134. Rosero v. State of Fla., 668 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
135. Lefemine, 573 So. 2d at 328.
136. Action Orthopedics, Inc. v. Techmedia, Inc., 759 F.Supp. 1566, 1569 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(quoting Southern Menhaden Co. v. How, 71 Fla. 128 (1916)).
137. Berndt, 465 So. 2d at 1265.
138. Action Orthopedics, 759 F. Supp. at 1569.
139. See Parrish v. Dougherty, 505 So. 2d 646, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (stating that a valid
liquidated damages clause is valid only as to damages which would not be ascertainable at the
time of contracting in the event of a breach and that any liquidated damages clause which later
proves to obtain an unconscionable result will not be enforced). The point here is that the only
damages which can be awarded under a liquidated damages clause are those that are not
ascertainable when the agreement is reached. However, even if that requirement is met, the courts
will still "Monday-morning quarterback" the contracting parties' clause to determine if, after a
breach, the enforcement would be unconscionable. The Parrish court required the parties to not
be able to ascertain potential damages and simultaneously be able to foresee the limit of potential
damages before it would enforce a liquidated damages clause.
140. Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. Jacobson, 614 So. 2d 520, 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
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litigation. 14' The downside to such a clause is the risk that a party suf-
fering damages from a contractual breach may find that he has underes-
timated his damages in the drafting of the clause. However, a clause
fixing unreasonably small liquidated damages is not void as a penalty. 142
In other words, a liquidated damages clause is "void as a penalty only in
regard to the party required to pay, not the payee. Under a liquidated
damages clause, a party entitled to receive an amount representing less
than his actual damages cannot assert that the clause operates as a pen-
alty against him."' 4 3 Even if such provisions are inadequate, greater
compensatory damages may not be awarded.'"
Thus, if a liquidated damages clause satisfies the established two-
prong-test, then "effect should be given to the stipulation as one for liq-
uidated damages, without regard to its designation or the amount of
injury actually suffered as a result of the breach."'' 45 The general rule in
Florida is to permit contracting parties to choose their remedies. A valid
liquidated damages clause will be enforced in the event the contractually
described breach occurs. The parties have chosen their remedy and they
are stuck with it.
However, the preceding analysis involves cases where no tort claim
is asserted. The principle issue in such cases is whether the liquidated
damages clause in the agreement amounts to a penalty. But the inquiry
should not necessarily end there. After all, if the contract as a whole
was induced by fraud then arguably any choice of remedy clauses con-
tained therein were also fraudulently induced.
B. Big Lies and Little Lies
Theoretically, in terms of fraudulent inducement, there is little if
any distinction between a contract with a liquidated damages clause and
a contract without one. For a fraudulent inducement claim to exist, the
tortious conduct must occur prior to the formation of the contract. Nec-
essarily, when the fraud actually occurs, the liquidated damages clause
141. See id. at 521. This statement, lifted from the Jacobson opinion, seems to oversimplify
the tension that Florida courts have articulated relating to enforcement of liquidated damages
clauses. See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text. If a valid clause must liquidate
unascertainable damages how can those damages be estimated? Furthermore, if the parties'
estimate of those unascertainable damages is off sufficiently to render the enforcement of the
clause unconscionable then not only do they not have a useful estimate to guage their potential
damages in the event of a breach but they also have costly litigation.
142. See Action Orthopedics, 759 F. Supp. at 1570.
143. Id.
144. See Hi Neighbor Enterprises, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 492 F. Supp. 823, 826 (N.D. Ha.
1980) (stating that compensatory damages can be no more than those set out in the agreements).
145. Action Orthopedics, 759 So. 2d at 1569.
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does not exist between the parties. Rather, it comes into being along
with the fraudulently induced contract.
A fraud in the inducement claim, whether based upon negligent
misrepresentation or intentional fraud, asserts that a legal "wrong" was
committed. The Second District Court of Appeals stated in Century
Properties, Inc. v. Machtinger, '46 that "fraud cannot be predicated solely
upon the failure to perform a promise.... However, a promise may be a
basis for fraud where there is evidence the promisor had a specific intent
not to perform at the time the promise was made." '147 The Machtinger
court provided for a remedy in tort when a promisor specifically
intended to abrogate his promise. To provide the foundation for the
independent tort, the promise would have to be such that, in its absence,
the promisee would not have assented; ergo, the contract was fraudu-
lently induced. One can imagine a scenario where a party, specifically
intending to abrogate his promise, also negotiates to insert a liquidated
damages clause to restrict available remedies in an action against him to
damages under the clause.
In such a scenario, the promisor has stated, "I promise to do X if
you will do Y." The co-existence of a specific intent not to do "X"
represents fraud-a big lie with big consequences for which the Macht-
inger court was willing to provide a tort remedy. But, should Macht-
inger preclude the operation of remedies clauses that may be contained
in the fraudulently induced contract?
It seems consistent with both tort and contract law that remedial
clauses of a fraudulently induced contracts be considered irrelevant to a
valid intentional tort claim against the promisor. Arguably, the fraud is
complete when the overall promise "to do X" is made with the requisite
intent "[not] to do X" and the promisee detrimentally relies on that
promise and offers his own promise in exchange. It would seem unjust
for the law to convert an independent tort claim based upon such a fraud
into a restricted contract claim based solely upon a choice of remedy
clause that happens to exist in the fraudulently induced contract. Doing
so would permit a liar to use a carefully crafted little lie to preclude his
victim from obtaining an otherwise valid remedy for a substantially
more injurious big lie.
C. If This is Freedom, I'll Do Without
Florida's law on liquidated damages clauses is rooted in the princi-
ple that contracting parties should be free to negotiate the terms of their
contracts subject only to public policy (e.g., the restriction against pen-
146. 448 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
147. Id. at 572 (citations omitted).
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alty clauses.)148 This same foundational principle also requires that par-
ties truthfully represent facts asserted during the contract negotiation
process. 14 9 Although a party negotiating a contract is not always
required to disclose all facts to his opponent, when he does speak, he
must do so truthfully. 5 °
Given such ideals, it would be contradictory that Florida's policy
against fraud and policy in favor of freedom of contract might be so
easily overthrown by the simple inclusion of a provision purporting to
liquidate damages for failure to perform when the promisor never
intended to perform. If this is the law, then the victim of such a fraud
would be doubly injured. He must not only judicially seek reparations
due to the breach (a costly endeavor notwithstanding his attempt to over-
come the remedial provision), but those reparations would be severely
limited by the very instrument that the fraud induced. This outcome
would bind the victim to a remedy for which he did not freely bargain
because it was fraudulently induced.
While it may appear superficially that the victim bargained for the
remedy, the clause itself is an essential part of a fraudulently induced
instrument. A contracting party who lies to induce another to bind him-
self in contract has taken from the defrauded party the ability to freely
negotiate. No negotiation has occurred at all as to those facts that were
falsely asserted. Rather the contracting party has tricked the victim.
Surely he was not bargaining for a lie but for a particular performance or
something of value. If this trickery counts for good-faith negotiation
then every scoundrel in Florida would try to inject such a clause in every
fraudulently induced contract to limit his damages to the contract claim.
Thus, the scoundrel would be the only party protected in the event the
victim discovers he has been victimized.
Before these strong words are carried too far, it is important to
observe that they suggest that a fraudulently induced contract is a "void"
contract, and thus no contract at all, because there was no mutual assent.
That conclusion may be "right" in rare instances where the falsely
asserted fact goes directly to the "character or essential terms of a pro-
posed contract."'' However, in the "great bulk of cases, the misrepre-
148. See Green v. Life & Health of Am., 704 So. 2d 1386, 1390 (Fla. 1998).
149. See Besett v. Basnett, 389 So. 2d 995, 998 (Fla. 1980) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 540-42 (1976)). The Restatment (2d) of Torts provides that "[t]he recipient of a
fraudulent misrepresentation of fact is justified in relying upon its truth, although he might have
ascertained the falsity of the representation had he made an investigation." Id. § 540.
150. See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985). In Johnson, the Supreme Court noted
that "[t]he law appears to be working toward the ultimate conclusion that full disclosure of all
material facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct demands it." Id. at 628.
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 163 (1976); see also FARNSWORTH supra note
16 § 4.10, at 249-50.
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sentation is seen as going only to the inducement, with the result that the
contract is voidable."'52 For the defrauded party, the result is the same.
A court may refuse to enforce the contract against the defrauded party
should that party refuse to perform. This action was illustrated by the
Florida Supreme Court when, quoting the Fifth District Court of
Appeals, it stated that "one who has been fraudulently induced into a
contract may elect to stand by that contract and sue for damages for the
fraud. When this happens and the defrauding party also refuses to per-
form the contract as it stands, he commits a second wrong."'1
53
What makes this question difficult is that both Florida's policy on
enforcing liquidated damages clauses and its policy on permitting
independent tort claims for fraud in the inducement partly find their
respective foundations in the same jealousy for freedom of contract.
When these two large bodies of law collide, a question arises as to which
body of law should rule? Still, this question does not frame the issue
properly. Considering that the answer's cash value lies in whether the
victim should enjoy the availability of the more liberal tort damages,
154
it is more logical to ask which law's policy would suffer the greater
offense if it were sacrificed to the other? This is similar to the lesser-of-
two-evils question characteristic of a conflict of laws analysis involving
the public policy of two independent jurisdictions which each have con-
tacts with a particular occurrence or transaction.15 5 Florida courts are
familiar with this analysis from their own choice of law cases.' 56 The
following section applies these principles by analogy.
D. When Tort and Contract Collide
In 1980, the Florida Surpreme Court adopted the analysis provided
in the Restatement Second, Conflicts of Laws, Section 6, when deciding
how to choose between conflicting laws of two jursidictions. 157 This
section of the Restatement lists the important factors for choice of law
considerations in all areas of law as: (a) the needs of the interstate and
international systems; (b) the relevant policies of the forum; (c) the rele-
vant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
152. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16 § 4.10, at 250 (emphasis added). In the majority of the
cases, the distinction only significantly effects how third parties, holders in due course, or bona
fide purchasers take property that is the subject of the "contract." Id.
153. HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 1996)
(quoting Williams v. Peak Resorts Int'l, Inc., 676 So. 2d 513, 517 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)).
154. See generally Williams, 676 So. 2d at 521 (discussing when it is appropriate to allow a
cause of action for tort damages in a breach of contract case).
155. See generally CAVERS, Tim CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965); E. SCOLES AND P. HAY,
CoNFLicr OF LAWS, §§ 17.11-17.17 (1982).
156. See, e.g., Mezroub v. Capella, 702 So. 2d 562, 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
157. See Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
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states in the determination of the particular issue; (d) the protection of
justified expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law; (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and (g)
ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. '58
Section 6 applies to cases where arisen has a conflict of laws
among independent jurisditions. It provides assistance in guiding an
analysis in choosing between two conflicting substantive law policies
within the same jurisdiction. However, not all of the principles listed in
Section 6 are relevant to this question. For example, subsection (a) "the
needs of the interstate and international systems," would not come into
play at all.' 59 Furthermore, subsections (b) and (c) would be unneces-
sary as there would be no other jurisdiction with which to compare Flor-
ida's important policy considerations. 60
Nevertheless, following the Restatement's relevant treatment of
choice of law by analogy, the court should ask some specific questions
to determine whether Florida's policy on enforcing otherwise valid liq-
uidated damages clauses should trump the policies which permit
independent torts, such as fraud in the inducement, to co-exist with a
contract claim. For instance, what public policies are represented by the
conflicting substantive laws? Second, the court should ask what the jus-
tified expectations of the parties were. A third question asks what are
the basic policies underlying the particular fields of law which are in
conflict? Fourth, the court ascertains what effect its ruling will have on
certainty, predictability and uniformity of results. Finally, how might
the court's ruling promote ease in the determination and application of
the law to be applied? In essence, the court would question the overall
effect of sacrificing one body of substantive law for a conflicting one?
As to the first question under the conflict of laws analogy, one
should recall that the law imposes certain societal concerns over any
duties mutually agreed to by contracting parties. For example, courts
(including Florida courts) will not enforce "illegal contracts."' 6' Even
the modem thinking of the Uniform Commercial Code imposes the duty
of "good faith and fair dealing" on every contract subject to the Code. 162
158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
159. See id. at 6(a).
160. See id. at 6(b), (c).
161. See Hoffman v. Boyd, 698 So. 2d 346, 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ("It had 'long been the
rule in a majority of the courts of this country and in this State that contracts intended to facilitate
or promote the procurement of a divorce will be declared illegal as contrary to public policy."')
(quoting Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1970) (citing Allen v. Allen, 1 II Fla. 733,
(1933) and Gallemore v. Gallemore, 94 Fla. 516, (1927))); see also Castro v. Sangles, 637 So. 2d
989, 991 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (holding that one may recover upon an apparently illegal contract
only if he has not been guilty of wrongdoing).
162. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990); cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.203 (West 1993).
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Thus, there already exists in Florida law an eye towards the public good
when interpreting a contract, assessing damages resulting from a breach,
or determining appropriate remedies.
Consider also, that when the law assesses damages in contract
cases, punitive damages are unavailable. 16 3 Punitive damages are tradi-
tionally available only in tort." In fact, the courts's refusal to validate
particular liquidation damages clauses generally reflects the law's insis-
tance the breach of a contractual duty does not amount to a wrong for
which a penalty (or punishment) is appropriate.1
65
Conversely, a victim of fraud may obtain punitive damages because
of the intentional nature of the tort.166 The law is, therefore, cognizant
of substantial harm to the public when parties behave so recklessly as to
create a substantial likelihood of injury to another or with the specific
intent to injure others. Punitive damages are the courts' way of permit-
ting the public, through juries, to punish the intentional tortfeasor and
extract more damages than actually suffered as reflected by the evi-
dence. 167  These damages are termed "exemplary."'' 68 This reflects
strong public policy against intentional moral wrongs such as fraud in
the inducement. It seems most appropriate to sustain the tort policy of
providing adequate compensatory and punitive remedies for fraud
despite any specific limitation on contract damages imposed by the poli-
cies governing the law on liquidated damages. But given the existence
of a liquidated damages clause in a contract, would the court's permis-
sion of the tort claim contradict what the parties intended or expected?
In following Florida's choice of law rules, the second issue courts
should address in choosing between contract or tort law principles
involves the justified expectation of the parties. Florida courts enforce
valid liquidated damages clauses because they reflect the intent of the
parties at the time of contracting to provide for their remedies in as
much as the law would allow. 169 Notwithstanding the parties' inten-
tions, the negotiation process and the performance and enforcement of
the agreement is ruled by overarching principles of "good faith" and
163. See Williams v. Peak Resorts Int'l. Inc., 676 So. 2d 513, 521 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
164. See Commissioner of the I.R.S. v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 343 (1995) ("The rule against
punitive damages prevails even if the breach [of contract] is willful or malicious, as long as the
breach does not amount to an independent tort."); see also Lewis v. Guthartz, 428 So. 2d 222, 223
(Fla. 1982).
165. See Lefemine v. Baron, 573 So. 2d 326, 330 (Fla. 1991).
166. See Burton v. Linotype Co., 556 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) ("Fraud in the
inducement and deceit are independent torts for which compensatory and punitive damages may
be recovered.").
167. See Ferguson Transp. Inc. v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 687 So. 2d 821, 822 (Fla. 1996).
168. Id. at 822-23.
169. See Humana Medical Plans, Inc. v. Jacobson, 614 So. 2d 520, 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
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"fair dealing." 170  Consider the significance of the Florida Supreme
Court's eighty-five year old opinion stating, "What is plainly injurious
to good faith ought to be considered as a fraud sufficient to impeach a
contract." 17 1 The tort action of fraud in the inducement exists in part
because of the violence that fraud exercises against the negotiation pro-
cess and freedom of contract.
It is true that when parties to a contract include a liquidated dam-
ages clause, they expect that their damages will be limited by the clause
in the event of a breach. However, when fraud is present in the negotia-
tion process, the law imposes other expectations. For example, Florida
courts have held that in such instances, the contract itself may be voided
as an equitable remedy.' 72 When the defrauding party argues that the
victim should only have expected that damages arising under the con-
tract would be limited by the liquidated damages clause, the courts
respond that fraud so egregiously disrupts freedom during negotiation,
that the parties are left with very little that they can justifiably expect.
In fact, given the courts's position on fraud in the inducement, the
defrauding party should only expect that he will be held to his bargain if
the victim decides to stand by the contract.1 73 The Third District Court
of Appeal has ruled that if the defrauding party refuses to perform, he
commits a second wrong for which the victim can claim recovery.1'7 4
The victim should therefore at least be permitted to expect that he may
rely on the truthfulness of the other party's assertions. After all, "The
interest protected by fraud is a plaintiff's right to justifiably rely on the
truth of a defendant's factual representation in a situation where an
intentional lie would result in loss to the plaintiff."'' 75
Thus parties cannot justifiably expect that their chosen remedies
will necessarily be upheld by the courts if the contract was induced by
fraud. To the contrary, the existence of fraud opens the door to various
mechanisms the courts often use to permit the victim to void and escape
170. See Green Companies of Fla. v. Kendall Racquetball Inv., 560 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Fla 3d
DCA 1990) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981)) ("It is fundamental
that '[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement."'). The Florida Supreme Court stated, "The right to make
contracts of any kind, so long as no fraud or deception is practiced and the contracts are legal in
all respects, is an element of civil liberty possessed by all persons who are sui juris." State ex rel.
Fulton v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 411 (1936).
171. 59 Fla. 517, 527 (1910). This opinion is a prime example of how some duties supercede
duties which arise among parties by virtue of their agreement. Here the court imposed an
overarching duty of "good faith" and permitted the breach of this duty to "impeach" the contract.
172. See Kelly v. Tworoger, 705 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); see also Petracca v.
Petracca, 706 So. 2d 904, 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
173. See Williams v. Peak Resorts Int'l, Inc., 676 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
174. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Pickard, 269 So. 2d 714, 723 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
175. Woodson v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 1327, 1330 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (rev'd on other grounds).
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the contract, 176 to enforce the contract,177 or arguably, to bring an
independent action in tort. 7 ' Therefore, it would not do substantial vio-
lence to either party's justifiable expectations if Florida courts were to
permit a tort claim in spite of a liquidated damages clause existing in the
mutual agreement between the parties.
Following the conflict of laws analysis, the court should next deter-
mine whether the policies forwarded by contract law or tort law would
suffer more seriously if sacrificed. This can be answered in terms of
whether the public will suffer more if one is sacrificed for the other.
179
If the remedial clause of the contract claim is sacrificed to the intentional
tort claim, the public suffers little, if any, harm. The clause was
designed to liquidate damages as between private parties who are privy
to the agreement and assume duties under the contract.180 A court's
refusal to enforce the clause does not principally involve the public's
interest because the parties owe no specific duty to the public to keep the
bargain. Should the clause be invalidated, no moral wrong would go
unpunished, and no damages for injury, except what can be established
by the evidence as compensatory, would be recovered. There is little the
public loses by permitting a liquidated damages clause to be overcome
by a tort claim.
Conversely, if the law is unable to levy punishment for intentional
wrongdoing, it could be harmed substantially. The public at large pos-
sesses a considerable interest that all persons, whether parties to a con-
tract or not, refrain from conduct that is intentionally tortious. For
instance, consider how Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 6.12
reads, as quoted by the Supreme Court of Florida in U.S. Concrete Pipe
Co. v. Bould:
If you find for (claimant) and find also that [the defendant] [any
defendant whom you find to be liable to (claimant)] acted with mal-
ice, moral turpitude, wantonness, wilfulness or reckless indifference
to the rights of others, you may, in your discretion, assess punitive
damages against such defendant as punishment and as a deterrent to
others.'
8 1
176. See Kelly v. Tworoger, 705 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); see also Petracca, 706 So.
2d at 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
177. See Ashland Oil, 269 So. 2d at 723.
178. See HTP Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996).
179. See, e.g., Beattey v. College Centre of Finger Lakes, Inc., 613 So. 2d 52, 55, (Fla. 4th
DCA 1992).
180. See Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244,
1246 (Fla. 1993); see also Future Tech Int'l. Inc. v. Tae II Media Inc., 944 F.Supp 1538, 1566
(S.D. Fla. 1996) (citing Kee v. National Reserve Life Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir.
1990)).
181. 437 So. 2d 1061, 1069 (Fla. 1983) (emphasis added).
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The use of punitive damages is the functional equivalent of the
defendant's peers punishing the defendant for egregious behavior.
182
The law recognizes and satisfies the need to permit juries to award puni-
tive damages to establish a minimum standard of behavior, below which
the public, through its juries, will not tolerate. To excise a jury's ability
to award punitive damages by enforcing a liquidated damages clause
contained in a fraudulently induced contract would be the equivalent of
placing the interests of a forward thinking scoundrel above the interests
of the public at large. What makes this even more evident is that if such
a liquidated damages clause were not enforced, there would be little vio-
lence done to the parties' justifiable expectations and little, if any, harm
to the public.
Finally, in deciding whether the policies of tort or contract should
prevail, the court should focus on attaining the goals of certainty and
ease of application. 83 Arguing for a bright-line rule, the law should, in
most cases involving fraud in the inducement, permit the independent
tort irrespective of any remedial clauses which may be contained in the
fraudulently induced contract. To begin with, this rule would produce
little uncertainty in the law. Any contract that the court might find
induced by fraud could be deemed voidable, accurately reflecting cur-
rent law in cases not involving remedial clauses.' 84 The result would be
that the independent tort claim would survive and clauses which purport
to remediate damages under the contract would apply solely to contract
claims asserted in separate counts. Each party would know that if it
were to perpetrate a fraud in inducing a contract, that the law would not
recognize any attempt to limit exposure to damages which would nor-
mally attend such an intentional tort. Thus, uniformity and certainty
could be readily achieved by such a bright-line rule and would protect
society's significant interest in preventing and punishing fraud.
As the above choice of law analysis demonstrates, Florida courts,
under their own precedents, have the legal tools to balance the public's
interests with that of the parties to a contract when tort law and contract
law collide. Interestingly, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Ray v.
Elks Lodge # 1870 of Stuart, 85 came to the same conclusion this article
proposes. Regrettably, it did so with no analysis whatsoever. 186
Although that court boldly stated that "[a] ... liquidated damages clause
... does not constitute a defense to a claim for fraud in the inducement,"
182. See Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 171 So. 2d 214, 221 (Fla. 1936).
183. See Mezroub v. Capella, 702 So. 2d 562, 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
184. See Kelly v. Tworoger, 705 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); see also Petracca v.
Petracca, 706 So. 2d 904, 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
185. 649 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
186. See id. at 293.
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it did not cite a single authority or provide any rationale for its ruling.187
Perhaps its conclusion was such an elementary proposition that the court
felt it superfluous to provide authority. But it should not escape reason-
able minds that the conflict over the application of the economic loss
rule to fraud in the inducement claims, which continued for several years
in Florida courts, belies the simplicity adopted by the Fourth District.
E. To Protect or Not to Protect?
If the Fourth District incorrectly decided Elk's Lodge,1 88 then, equi-
tably speaking, a liquidated damages clause raises substantial concerns
regarding contracting parties' abilities to protect themselves from fraud
in the inducement. As held by the Second District Court of Appeal in
Century Properties, Inc. v. Machtinger,189 when a party promises to per-
form his part of a bargain while possessing the specific intent to not
perform, a valid fraud claim exists. 190 But if a Machtinger-type victim
anticipates the possibility of misrepresentation and bargains for a liqui-
dated damages clause, the only protected party would be the culprit.
Furthermore, the only protection the clause would actually provide
would be to benefit the culprit by barring the victim from suing for sub-
stantial tort damages. The victim would remain utterly exposed to the
fraud and significantly restricted in the contract claim. Hindsight likely
would prove painful for the victim in that a rejected opportunity to
refuse the clause probably arose during the bargaining process.
The Machtinger victim, limited to the remedies provided for in a
liquidated damages provision, would have been better off to remain
naive in the bargaining process. Had the victim ignored the potential for
misrepresentation, tort law would have afforded a remedy for the cul-
prit's misrepresentation. Such a result turns contract law and tort law on
their respective heads.
V. CONCLUSION
As this article demonstrates, Florida courts have settled on permit-
ting claims of fraud in the inducement despite Florida's economic loss
rule. The rationale for this result rests on differences that exist between
the elements necessary to prove the intentional tort as opposed to an
claim under the contract. The courts seem comfortable allowing the
fraud claim to coincide along side a contract claim for breach due to the
intentional nature of the tort. But, turning again to the hypothetical in
187. Id.
188. See id. at 292.
189. 448 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
190. See id. at 572-73.
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Part I, should Jane Acquiror's claim be permitted notwithstanding the
liquidated damages clause which she undoubtedly believed would pro-
tect her from fraud in the negotiation process?
In the facts presented, Acquiror realized that during the negotiation
process for the sale of XYZ Corporation, Bob Owner was actively and
intentionally preventing her from obtaining pertinent information. As
the events unfolded, it became apparent that Owner had in fact con-
cealed that pertinent information in cleverly recorded transactions and
contracts with the government. As this article reflects, what makes
Acquiror's case so difficult is that she permitted Owner to include the
liquidated damages clause in the sales contract which dealt precisely
with the value of XYZ.
Notwithstanding this difficulty, Florida's policy supporting the
enforcement of liquidated damages clauses would not necessarily be
offended by permitting the fraud claim to co-exist with the contract
claim. A final analogy may be in order. Consider for instance the
Fourth District Court of Appeal's handling of a similar issue in Location
100, Inc. v. Gould S.E.L. Computer Systems, Inc.1 91 In that case, the
plaintiff, a seller of certain commercial real estate, instituted an action to
recover as liquidated damages earnest money deposited by the defend-
ant.192 The defendant counterclaimed that the seller had fraudulently
misrepresented certain significant characteristics about the property.
1 93
The contract contained a provision whereby the buyer would be
obligated to pay the seller's attorney's fees in the event that any dispute
arose "out of the contract" for sale.1 94 The case went to the jury on the
issue of fraud along with other claims and counterclaims. The seller
won in the trial court and filed a subsequent motion for attorneys' fees
under the express term of the contract. 19 The trial court awarded the
fees to the seller and the Fourth District reversed stating "an action to
recover for fraud in the inducement is based, not on the contract, but on
the tort.
19 6
The above result was obtained notwithstanding the intention of the
parties as reflected by the express language of a contractual term. That
term purported to deal precisely with the subject matter of the subse-
quent motion and appeal and yet the fraud claim overcame the contract
term. Moreover, the defendant did not successfully prove the fraud
claim. The seller won at trial and defeated the tort claim. Nevertheless,
191. 517 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).
192. See id. at 701.
193. See id.
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because the fraud counterclaim was not a cause of action based on con-
tract, the court permitted the defendant to evade the clause regarding the
payment of attorneys' fees. For similar reasons, the existence of a liqui-
dated damages clause should not preclude a tort claim for fraud in the
inducement.
On appeal, the Location court required on remand that the trial
court below delineate what fees were paid to the seller's attorneys to
defend against the contract-based counterclaims and what was paid to
defend against the tort claim.' 97 It ordered that the award for attorneys'
fees be reduced by the amount paid to defend against the fraud
counterclaim.
A similar process could be followed when a liquidated damages
clause deals with the subject matter that later is discovered to be the
basis of a fraudulent inducement. The court has no need to dismiss
either the contract or the tort claim but can permit both to co-exist.
Under the contract claim, the plaintiff may be limited by the liquidated
damages claim. Under the fraud claim, however, the traditional tort
remedies could be afforded the plaintiff without doing violence to either
cause of action.
Under this analysis, Jane Acquiror should be permitted to bring the
contract claim seeking enforcement of the liquidated damages clause
along with the fraud in the inducement claim. Alternatively, she could
seek to rescind the contract, recover from Bob Owner what money he
obtained from the sale of XYZ under the principle of restitution, and still
file the fraud in the inducement cause of action. Under the fraud claim,
Acquiror should also be permitted to recover the $75,000 spent in re-
arranging her corporate structure in her preparation to recieve XYZ
under her corporate umbrella. Furthermore, she should be permitted to
pray for punitive damages, the result of which would be subject to the
standard analysis under Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer.198
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